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NEGLECTED VALUES, SHRUNKEN AGENTS, 
HAPPY ENDINGS: A REPLY TO ROGERS1 
Marilyn McCord Adams 
In my book Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God, I belabor the lameness 
of moral categories for grasping either what is so bad about horrors or what 
their remedy might be. To make this point vivid, I try to show how the 
purity and defilement calculus and the honor code do a better job. To 
underline how morals are not what is fundamentally at stake between God 
and human agents, I also appeal to the metaphysical "size gap" between 
God and creatures. My critics-including Katherin A. Rogers-have found 
these moves puzzling and have drawn implications from them that I never 
intended. T try to dispel confusion by re-emphasizing the fact that these 
alternative conceptual schemes are not congruent with one another, and by 
reasserting the need for a "developmental double-take" that sizes human 
agents and their competency both horizontally in relation to one another 
and vertically in relation to God. 
I. Neglected Values: 
My recent book, Horrendous Evils lind the Goodness of God,> features neglect-
ed values. Beginning with the minuses, I aimed to rivet attention on the 
very worst evils of human experience--horrendous evils, which I defined as 
evils participation in which constitutes prima facie reason to doubt whether 
the participant's life can be a great good to him/her on the whole. My sus-
picion-which I tried to confirm with the arguments of chapters 2 and 3-
was that a kind of complacency had set in, that Best of All Possible Worlds 
and Free Will approaches only seemed to work because horrors had not 
been squarely confronted. Having faced horrors in life, my own theoretical 
reflection convinced me-as I attempted to explain in chapters 3 and 4-
that moral categories are particularly lame when it comes to capturing 
what is so bad about them, to locating their root causes, and to identifying 
remedies that might restore the possibility of positive meaning for horror-
participants' lives. 
It was in this connection that I looked to other neglected values-to the 
categories of purity and defilement (in chapter 5), to the honor code (in 
chapter 6), and to aesthetics (in chapter 7)-for alternative conceptual 
housing. Horror participation stains because it turns both victim and per-
petrator into caricatured members of their kind. It shames by degrading, at 
the highest level of abstraction by disabling both perpetrators and victims 
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as meaning-makers, by stumping them and sensitive onlookers as to how 
or what positive sense could be made of their lives. I located the primary 
root of human radical vulnerability to horrors in what we are, in our meta-
physically hybrid condition as personal animals. I contended that created 
matter and spirit are an "odd couple" that run interference with one anoth-
er, that personal animality placed in an environment of real and apparent 
scarcity is dysfunctionally heterogeneous and therefore unclean (d. chap-
ter 5). If I looked for root causes of horrors in what we arc rather than what 
we do, I also sought the cornerstone of the remedies (pulled together in 
chapter 8) in incommensurate Divine Goodness, in what God is. The Bad 
News here is that what God is so metaphysically outclasses what creatures 
are as to make us all-however fine specimens of our kind we may be-
unclean before God. The compensating Good News is that-because of 
this very metaphysical size-gap-the Goodness that God is, is superabun-
dantly sufficient when brought into a variety of relations with any and all 
horror participation to defeat its negative value within the context of the 
horror participants' lives. Thus, Divine identification with human horror 
participation in Christ crucified, Divine gratitude for our willingness to be 
personal animals and slog through a human life with all of its costs (a la 
Julian of Norwich), Divine good-pleasure forever after confer immeasur-
able honor which swallows up shame. God as Inner Teacher washes away 
our metaphysical uncleanness, by entering into a triangulated functional 
collaboration, which-as it becomes evermore explicit and intentional from 
our side--coordinates matter and spirit into a harmonious working rela-
tionship. Since it is only dysfunctional heterogeneity that is unclean, this 
functional triangulation reclassifies us as "new creations," as fitting speci-
mens of a different kind. Likewise, just as hypostatic union with the 
humanity of Christ fits it for Trinitarian fellowship, so functional collabora-
tion with the Inner Teacher issuing in an I-not-I-but-Christ identity polish-
es us up for heavenly society. And so I thought my appeal to neglected 
values not only forced us to face the very worst evils, but also enabled us to 
envision the possibility of happy endings for horror participants, post-
mortem destinies that enable them to recognize and appropriate depth of 
positive meaning in horror shattered ante-mortem careers. 
Katherin A. Rogers, in her characteristically lively and provocative cri-
tique/ finds my fascination with neglected values decidedly wrong, even 
disastrously dangerous. She is dissatisfied with my definition of horrors 
and unpersuaded by my attempts to demonstrate the impotence of free 
will approaches. Throughout her article she reasserts "the Augustinian 
tradition" with its "free fall" explanation of the origin of evil, in particular 
of our present condition, of the dysfunctional state of our personal animali-
ty (in Augustinian tenus, ignorance and difficulty), and of our location in 
an environment where we are radically vulnerable to horrors. Rogers 
presses not only the relevance of moral categories, but takes her stand on 
the bedrock of moral realism, which she suspects me of rejecting. She con-
tends that my use of the metaphysical size-gap to shrink human agency 
threatens to erase the imago dei and so to eliminate human being as an ana-
logical base for conceiving of God. Likewise, she alleges, my interpretation 
of the metaphysical gap through purity and defilement categories robs us 
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of our capacity for sin and so abolishes sin as an evaluative category. The 
insupportable consequences of my alternative diagnosis of the root cause 
of evil are thus "the abolition of sin" and the inability to say that God is 
good in any meaningful sense. Rogers thinks I should have known better: 
after all, my account runs counter to a whole cloud of witnesses, not only 
ancient and honorable, but modem and multitudinous. The marginality of 
my position should stand as an advance warning to me and to others, that 
"standard brand" "orthodox" Christians should reject it as pernicious at 
worst and at least false. 
Rogers reactions expose points of vigorous disagreement and patches of 
serious misunderstanding between us. She rightly targets some areas 
where my position is underdeveloped. I hope in replying to clarify where I 
stand. 
II. Realism about Which "Values"? 
Certainly, in my book and earlier articles,4 I offer readers plenty of rea-
son to doubt my commitment to moral realism. I begin (in chapter 3) with 
the symptom-that moral conceptuality is inadequate to grasp horrors, 
their roots of their remedies. I insist (in chapters 1,5, and 6) that the meta-
physical size-gap means that God is not a member of our moral communi-
ty and conclvde that morality cannot grasp what is at stake between us 
and God. I confront readers5 with the fact that societies have evolved quite 
different systems of interpersonal evaluation which have arisen and domi-
nated by turns with changing systems of social organization. I refer to 
"morality" as a "useful framework for evaluatively challenged human col-
lectives" and confess to the suspicion that it never penetrates to any nor-
mative core.6 And in concluding, I leave readers with the open question, 
"what are we to make of the fact that evaluative schemes no longer domi-
nant in Western industrial societies-the purity and defilement calculus 
and the honor code-do a better job of handling the horrendous than 
morality does?"7 
At the same time, I meant to take a page from Anselm in endorsing a 
metaphysical realism about what medievals sometimes call natural good-
ness. Without worrying the now-controversial concept of nature, I have-
like Anselm-taken it for granted that God is Goodness Itself, that natures 
form an excellence hierarchy, that the metaphysical size-gap between 
Divine and other natures is so vast that created natures are almost nothing 
although they are yet something insofar as they are somehow Godlike. 
Without entering into the vexed debate on just how to draw the line 
between realism and anti-realism, I was assuming such comparative natur-
al excellences to be facts of the matter, prior in the order of explanation to 
any human thoughts or conventions about it. I also supposed that the 
goodness of Divine and created natures (unlike the existence of the latter) 
was not a product of contingent Divine choice. My proposed solutions to 
the problem of horrors rest on a variety of theses-that God is incommen-
surate Goodness, that appropriate intimacy with God is incommensurately 
good-for created persons, that one proper function of created persons is 
meaning-making, that personal animality cannot be properly coordinated 
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without functional collaboration with the Inner Teacher-claims that I 
understood to be about (what Rogers calls) "absolutely objective" facts of 
the matter-facts about what God is and what human beings are. 
Nevertheless, I did not understand Anselm in the Monologion to be talk-
ing about moral goodness. (If I am not mistaken, the words 'moral' and 
'ethics' never occur in his principal works, neither as applied to God nor as 
applied to created persons.) In De Veritate, Anselm does argue that all 
creatures-non-rational as well as rational, fire as well as humans-{)we it 
to God to be and to do that for which they came to be (that for which they 
were made; ad quod factum est). By contrast, God does not owe creatures 
anything. But such obligations are fundamentally metaphysical-although 
Anselm didn't, he might have said natural-based as they are on the fact 
that to be a creature is to be metaphysically derivative. 
I did not and do not have a settled answer to my concluding question, 
what to make of the fact that the purity and defilement calculus and the 
honor code shed more penetrating light on the horrendous than modern 
moral categories do? It may, nevertheless, be useful to sketch out the 
Anselmian analogy that lay in the back of my mind. Because-for 
Anselm--€ach creatable nature just is an imperfect way of being Godlike, 
each can serve as a lens that both focuses something about and at the same 
time more or less outrageously caricatures Supreme Goodness. So, too, 
with the various evaluative conceptual frameworks or "language games" 
that humans have evolved and been played-sometimes separately, some-
times more than one together-in different social circumstances. My 
assumption was that none would be useful if it didn't illuminate "meta-
physically real" "convention-independent" value from some angle. But just 
as bovine and platypus natures bring different aspects of Supreme 
Goodness into view, while gold and human being pierce through to Divine 
perfection at different depths; so the various evaluative language games 
represent non-congruent conceptual grids through which we attempt to 
grasp convention-independent value realities. Each fits some such realities 
better than others. Where several apply, they may grasp the convention-
independent value realities at different levels of superficiality or depth. 
Thus, when a menstrous woman punches a male suitor and gives him a 
bloody nose, the purity and defilement calculus judges the suitor unclean 
by contact, the honor code says he has been insulted and humiliated, while 
modem morality may praise her courage in defending herself or blame her 
for unwarranted assault and battery. Here, we are apt to feel that morality 
offers the most penetrating evaluative angle. By contrast, my claim has 
been, when the male aggressor first rapes a woman and then axes off her 
arms, it is true but superficial to say that she has been morally wronged; the 
language of stain and shame, violation, degradation, and distortion cuts 
closer to the evaluative heart. Because each concephlal framework man-
ages some things well but is woefully inadequate to others, the evaluative 
schemes prove to be complementary as well as competitive--which helps 
to explain why they dominate rather than replace one another even today. 
Moreover, Anselmian creatable natures admit of two levels of meta-
physical analysis-more superficially, bovine nature is constituted by 
powers to moo and munch grass, chew cud and reproduce, in general to 
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engage in bovine functions; more fundamentally, bovine nature is an 
imperfect way of striving to be Godlike. By remote analogy, we can take 
evaluative conceptual frameworks and their application from an anti-real-
ist perspective, and count all kinds of claims as true within the framework 
of those conventions. But we can also admit that in one way or another 
they are aiming to bring convention-independent value realities into focus, 
with now greater, now lesser success. 
Alternatively (and maybe or maybe not equivalently), just as John Hick 
regards the cultures (practices and conceptual schemes) associated with 
the world's great religions, as socially evolved human responses to the 
Real8; so (with as much or as little clarity) I was imagining the plurality of 
evaluative frameworks to be socially evolved human responses to conven-
tion-independent value realities. And just as Hick regards the distinctive 
truth-claims of the various religions as mythically or metaphorically true 
but not literally true, so I am willing to say that the many and various eval-
uative claims of the alternative schemes are true but that their truth has a 
conventional aspect insofar as the value frameworks within which the 
assertions are made, are socially constructed. Nevertheless, I take both the 
schemes and the true value claims made within them to point to beyond 
themselves to convention-independent value realities, which they focus 
with more or less clarity and in different ways. 
III. Shrunken Agents: 
In my book, I appealed to the metaphysical size-gap between God and 
creatures to underline the radical disproportion in agent compentency and 
thereby to discredit applications of the Doing/ Allowing and New 
Intervening Agent principles to shift responsibility for the origin of evil off 
Divine shoulders onto ours. I attempted to remodel Divine-human rela-
tions by substituting the image of mother to infant or toddler for that of 
parent to teenager or adult to adult. I also used the metaphysical size-gap 
to undermine the notion that human agency has sufficient dignity for God 
to be obliged to pay it the respect of leaving it-apart from creation and 
conservation-to its own devices and allowing or requiring it to live with 
the (eternal) consequences of its choices and actions. I dramatized these 
points by contending that "because of the size gap nothing we could be or 
do could count-simply by virtue of what it is-as an appropriate move in 
relation to God, any more than a worm's wiggling to the right could be 
intrinsically more respectful of humans than its wiggling to the left."9 In 
Concl uding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard (or Climacas) agrees. IiJ 
Rogers recognizes that the metaphysical size-gap is likewise an 
Augustinian/ Anselmian theme. I I But lithe tradition" strings us out in the 
tension between two poles-the metaphysical gulf between Divine and cre-
atable natures, on the one hand, and the fact that creatable natures are consti-
tuted as ways of being imperfectly Godlike--enough so that rational natures 
are said to be in the image of God. She thinks I unbalance the teeter-totter by 
emphasizing the former to the exclusion of the latter. She contends that 
agents who possess Augustinian free agency are "made metaphysically clos-
er to the image of God" and so are better than my "unclean infant 
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humans,"12 and she wonders whether-on my view-lithe sort of agency 
which the enabling work of the Holy Spirit leads us to will ever be the sort of 
free agency which Anselm and other free fall theodicists envision."13 
Certainly, it was not my intention to obliterate the imago dei in human 
beings, but rather to refocus it on human beings as persons, whose essen-
tial functions include meaning-making. Horror participation shatters the 
image, insofar as it stalemates human capacity to make sense of life. Hence 
we need a Savior Who can put Humpty Dumpty back together again and 
resurrect our capacity to participate in the meaning-making process. 
When I borrowed the mother-infant/toddler model from Julian of 
Norwich, J took for granted the developmental "double-take" she effects. 
Neither Dame Julian nor I had any intention of erasing the facts of human 
development that psychologists attempt to chart-how humans normally 
begin copeless but grow in cognitive and emotional capacities through var-
ious stages and levels towards adult agency which our society rightly 
holds morally accountable for many of its intentions and deeds. To be 
sure, I have emphasized that human development is easily skewed by hos-
tile environments and the peculiarities of adult caretakers and role-models. 
And I have characterized adult human agency as "impaired" and not obvi-
ously possessed of the incompatibilist freedom posited by some moralists 
(such as Ockham or Kant) and attributed to supralapsarian angels and 
humans by free-fall theorists (such as Augustine or Anselm).q I have 
remained agnostic but negatively inclined on the question of whether we 
have incompatibilist freedom. Since, however, I have aligned myself with 
those who deny that incompatibilist freedom is presupposed for ordinary 
moral practices, I have readily granted that adult human agency such as 
we possess has the stature and involves the sort of freedom that makes it 
appropriate for us to hold one another morally responsible in roughly the 
ways that we do. Accordingly, I agree--pace Rogers-that there are signifi-
cant moral differences among human agents, that Hitler and Stalin were 
morally wicked in the extreme, while St. Francis and Mother Teresa were 
morally superlative1s; that the moral gap between horror perpetrators and 
horror victims is often (although not always) comparably wide. 
Nevertheless, a developmental "double-take" is required, because it is one 
thing to size up an individual human's agency in relation to other human 
beings, and quite another to measure it in relation to God. Dame Julian's 
point and mine was that the personal capacities of even the most mature 
adult human agents are infantile in comparison with God's! 
As to my wiggle-worm analogy, Rogers' reaction does demonstrate 
how my remark is apt to mislead unless further distinctions are drawn. 
Here I meant to be signing on to the Franciscan appreciation that finite 
goods cannot command the Divine will, that none is intrinsically worthy of 
Divine acceptance--a point that Scotus presses and that Ockham drama-
tizes with his declaration that God would do nothing wrong in damning 
those who loved and conferring eternal beatitude on those who hated God 
most! So far as convention-independent value rankings are concerned (d. 
section II above), human being is more valuable than worm, virtuous 
behavior (arguably) more Godlike than vicious, but only by a finite mea-
sure. Thus, viewed from the top down, even un fallen human being would 
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be intrinsically (by virtue of what it is) no more compelling for God than 
worm is; nor would the virtuous person intrinsically have any more claim 
to be awarded eternal life than the vicious.16 
Bottom up, however, the perspective is different. I have gone along with 
the Anselmian idea that all creatable natures have a Godward thrust-find 
God compelling in the (alternative) sense that they just are imperfect ways of 
being Godlike. Thus, there is something intrinsically and naturally appropri-
ate for worms in aiming Godward-viz., worm functioning, doing "the 
worm thing." And there is also something intrinsically and naturally appro-
priate for humans in aiming Godward-viz., to enter ever more intentionally 
and explicit1y into functional collaboration with God in coordinating matter 
and spirit and in making sense out of life, and to reach for that intimacy that 
(by virtue of what human being is and what God is) is incommensurately 
good-for us. But-and this was my original point-none of this intrinsically 
and naturally appropriate behavior makes humans any more than worms 
intrinsically and naturally fit to enter the courts of the Lord! 
Do I agree that Augustinian agency is better, objectively more Godlike 
than my intrinsically unclean infants? It all depends on how much is 
packed into the concept of Augustinian agency. If it is supposed to include 
stature sufficient to qualify as a "new intervening agent" in relation to God, 
then-invoking the metaphysical size-gap once again-I deny that this is 
metaphysically possible. Would Anselmian agents enjoy more autonomy 
than my triangulated agents advancing in explicit functional collaboration 
with the Holy Spirit? I find that hard to say. For Anselm, the affection for 
justice is as much required for appropriate functioning as the affection for 
advantage is. Yet, Anselm stresses, the affection for justice is a donum super-
additum, a gift of Divine grace over and above our nature-constituting pow-
ers. Likewise, he demonstrates in the Proslogion, how all our intellectualiz-
ing is God-infested in the sense of involving collaboration with an Inner 
Teacher, Who is badgered with questions until He furnishes the insights 
which the human investigator articulates before questioning some more. 
Turning from metaphysics to epistemology, and to Rogers' charge that 
my low estimate of human nature disqualifies it as an analogical base for 
naming the Divine,17 I respond that "the Augustinian tradition" and I both 
share the same infralapsarian boat. Rogers herself suggests that "free fall 
theorists" would agree with my assessment of our present predicament; the 
difference is that they posit a primordial position in which our agency was 
not beset with ignorance and difficulty and in which we were not vulnera-
ble to environmental illS.18 Either way, our characterizations of God will be 
projected from the human condition and human relationships as we find 
them now, in this world in its present condition. Either way, such models 
stand to be corrected by insights supplied-even ante mortem-by the Inner 
Teacher. Neither way-pace Pseudo-Dionysius-is the metaphysical gap 
supposed to be matched by an epistemological gulf of comparable size. 
IV. Sin, Short-Shrifted! 
Christian soteriology begins with the twin problems-that the human 
condition and Divine-human relations are non-optimal-and posits Jesus 
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as the Savior Who reverses these ills. But non-optimality can be sub-
sumed under manv rubrics. For Greek Fathers of the Church, death was 
the chief difficultY; Adam's disobedience corrupted human nature, but 
assumption by the Divine Word restored immortality. For Augustine, 
Anselm, and latin school theologians generally, sin looms large. Lest the 
horrendous be screened out, I deliberately shifted focus: the human condi-
tion is non-optimal because we are radically vulnerable to, inevitable indi-
vidual or collective participants in, horrors; Divine-human relations are 
non-optimal because God has set us up for horrors by creating us (allow-
ing us to evolve as) personal animals in an environment of real and appar-
ent scarcity. I argued (in chapter 3) that-where horrors are concemed-
sin (in the sense of a disobedient use of created free will) is neither the 
fundamental explanalls nor the principal explanandum. That is why I gave 
sin short shrift in my book. 
Rogers is convinced that-where sin is concemed-T come not merely to 
neglect but to abolish. At any rate, she forwards (what split out into) a trio 
of considerations that this is a logical consequence of my views. First, she 
suggests, it follows from my alleged anti-realism about morality that no 
behavior is objectively wrong. Second, my use of the metaphysical size-
gap to reduce human agency to infantile status denies humans the agent 
competence required to be a sinner. Third, if our uncleanness is a meta-
physically necessary consequence of what human being is, we are all 
equally unclean and-because this uncleanness is not within our power-
none of us is blameworthy, all are equally good, and the term 'good' is 
thereby eviscerated of positive content. 19 As if in a triumphant reductio ad 
absurdum, she declares that on my view there will be "no value difference 
between" Hitler and Mother Teresa "viewed objectively and in relation-
ship to God"!"" 
Such arguments seriously miscalculate the implications of my position. 
To be sure, my value-realism does make the metaphysical gap and the 
metaphysical straddling nature of personal animality an "absolutely objec-
tive" matter of fact. As to metaphysical size and constitution, we 
humans-Hitler and Mother Teresa, horror perpetrators and their vic-
tims-are "objectively" on a par. Moreover, the metaphysical relation 
between what God is and what we are, the metaphysical nature of matter 
on the one hand and spirit on the other, are metaphysical necessities. 
Thus, they are-as I said in my book-neither within anyone's power, nor 
are they anyone's fault. 
Tn an earlier paper and in my book, I advance the idea of equating sin-
at its most basic level-with uncleanness.21 On this usage, insofar as all 
creatures are unclean in relation to God, absent a Divinely initiated cleans-
ing ritual, Rogers is right: Hitler and Mother Teresa, horror perpetrators 
and horror victims, are alike sinners in the sense that they are equally 
unclean (d. Peter's Luke 5:8 exclamation, "Depart from me, for I am a sin-
ful man, 0 Lord!"; also Isaiah's response to theophany in Isa 6:5-7). 
Likewise, since all (mere) humans are born immature and so incompetent 
either to coordinate matter and spirit or to cooperate effectively with the 
Inner Teacher, all (mere) humans are sinners twiceover, since-to begin 
with-they share the uncleanness of dysfunctional heterogeneity within 
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their very selves. While the purity and defilement calculus is itself a social-
construction, so that claims about purity and defilement have a conven-
tional aspect, it is clear how in this case its language points to "absolutely 
objective" matters of value-fact. 
Does it follow from this that there is no "objective" evaluative difference 
in condition and performance between the adult agencies of Hitler on the 
one hand and Mother Teresa on the other? Here again, it depends on how 
one precisions the notion of "absolutely objective" or "realism" in "value 
realism." Because human agents are thinkers and choosers whose agency 
is shaped by social practices in many ways, it becomes tricky to specify 
which human thoughts and conventions are to be bracketed to get at what 
they "really" and "objectively are." Supposing some adequate account can 
be given, I do not see how it follows from the claim that Hitler and Mother 
Teresa are alike personal animals, tl1.at there is no "objective" difference 
between them in whether, how, and in what degree they learn to cooperate 
with the Inner Teacher and grow towards harmonious functioning. Even 
if the moral evaluations of Hitler and Mother Teresa are not "absolutely 
objective," why should it follow that there are no metaphysically real value 
differences between them because of differences in their acts? Top down, I 
have insisted (d. section III above), these differences would not be com-
pelling, would not-by virtue of what they intrinsically are--constitute 
any entitlement on Mother Teresa's part to receive eternal life from God. 
Bottom up, however, they constitute a big "objective" difference between 
her ante-mortem working relationship with God and Hitler's and so in the 
functional versus dysfunctional condition of their agencies. 
Moreover, my conjecture--that placing personal animals in an environ-
ment of real and apparent scarcity makes horror participation inevitable-
was not meant as the claim that each and every instance of horror perpe-
tration is metaphysically necessary/2 but rather as the assertion that some 
horrors or other will inevitably occur. Consequently, I have never claimed 
that Hitler's choice to build crematoria or Nazi orders to march children 
into fiery ditches, were metaphysically necessary or not within the perpe-
trator's power (in the sense monitored by conventional moral practice) to 
refuse. The reader needs to keep in mind that 'sin' is not univocal but 
probably equivocal or at most analogical as applied to uncleanness on the 
one hand, and non-cooperative choices and actions on the other. This is 
because, once again, the two value grids-the purity/defilement calculus 
and contemporary moral conceptuality-are not congruent with one 
another. Thus, it does not follow from the fact that uncleanness besets all 
of us, is metaphysically necessary and so not within our power, that that 
we are all equally and necessarily sinners in the sense of compiling records 
of choice and action that have the same moral worth, or that we are all sin-
less because none of our choices or actions is within our power. 
Rogers offers a fourth argument that my view "entails the denial of the 
existence of evil in the Augustinian sense of sin": for "the Augustinian 
draws a radical distinction between the sinner and the innocent, whereas" 
I "apparently" do "not see any difference that makes a difference between the 
victim and the perpetrator of horrendous evil." Her evidence is that "in 
explaining how these two came to be participants in horrendous evil and 
A REPLY TO ROGERS 223 
in discussing how that participation is ultimately to be overbalanced by 
good, the distinction plays absolutely no role." Noting that I am a univer-
salist, she finds that for me "the story of salvation is the same whether one 
is merely a victim or also a perpetrator of horrors."23 
At a high level of abstraction what Rogers says is true and penetrates to 
one of my main points: viz., that in the region of horrors the notions of guilt 
and innocence hobble, because horrors are levellers, inflicting their prima facie life-
ruining power on both perpetrator and victim alike. Moral innocence in the 
Auschwitz inmate was usually not adequate protection from the stain of 
the horrendous. Most people-even if morally innocent relatively speak-
ing-did not have strength of character sufficient to ward off the meaning-
destroying corrosion. Moral innocence becomes hollow for those whose 
lives have been shattered. Nor did Nazi officials, camp guards, and collab-
orators--€ven if never caught and convicted of "crimes against humani-
ty" -escape the prima facie soul-destroying power of their deeds. 
Whatever their post-war material circumstances, the problem common to 
horror-perpetrators and their victims was humanly irreparable meaning-
lessness and fragmentation. And so, at a high level of abstraction, the solu-
tion to that problem is the same for all participants and involves Divine ini-
tiatives of the following three sorts. First, God must identify with their 
participation in horrors and thereby catch up their horror-participation 
into the fabric of their relationship with God. Second, God will have to 
heal and teach them how to appropriate some of the positive meanings 
such Divine identification affords. Third, for them to be finally free, God 
will have permanently to re-place them in an environment where they are 
no longer radically vulnerable to horrors. 
For the individual, however, whether one is a victim or a perpetrator 
makes a huge difference to the kinds of meanings life can have: to what has 
to be defeated, to the specific character that has to be transformed, to the 
psycho-spiritual exercizes that are required to get there, to the amount and 
kinds of suffering involved in being "born again/from above." Nor have I 
had any intention of erasing these differences, which in any event occupy a 
good deal of my pastoral attention. I gave them short shrift in my book, 
not because they are unimportant, but because there are so many varia-
tions on the theme, and because the general problem-of whether and how 
horrors could be defeated at all-proved so hard. 
V. The Vice-Grip of Morality? 
In characterizing Divine-human relations, some Christian theologians 
begin with creation, others with soteriology, still others with eschatology. 
The first group accentuates the positive, spotlights the fact that God creat-
ed the world and called it good. The second group focuses on our "non-
optimality" problems and seeks a Savior to solve them. The third group 
starts by envisioning the end towards which we are headed, our supernat-
ural goal and destiny. Here there is disagreement about whether evil will 
last forever, about whether salvation is for everyone, for the many, or for 
the few. To the extent that we philosophers of religion and philosophical 
theologians fix our attention on the problem of evil, we join the second 
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group. It is therefore not surprizing if we allow our conception of the 
problem and the parameters of our "solutions," set the tone, become defin-
itive for what is at stake between God and us. 
Thus, many contemporary free will defenders whom Rogers joins, give 
the impression that what is primarily at stake between God and us is 
whether we exercize our God-given freedom to choose for God or against 
God, by conforming to God's will for our lives. Insofar as morality is the 
conceptuality in terms of which they are accustomed to evaluate free 
action, it is an easy step into the assumption that God regards moral perfor-
mance, its recognition, its reward and plmishment as eternally significant. 
Eschatology is not forgotten, but-as with Kant-the featured purpose of 
post-mortem preservation is to make sure that the difference between the 
innocent and the guilty, between faithful servants and unrighteous rebels 
is eternally reflected in the consequences (even on Rogers' universalist 
hypothesis, split-levels of happiness for the freely compliant versus the 
Divinely coerced). In this, contemporary free will defenders fall in with 
turn-of-the-Iast-century British theology, that tended to rework soteriology 
in Kantian moral terms.24 
Philosophers may reasonably disagree about the nature of human digni-
ty, our inalienable right to autonomy, the importance of distinguishing the 
morally guilty from the morally innocent, even on the justifiability and 
desirability of hell and damnation. But the emotional energy with which 
some free will defenders insist on them suggests a pinched sense of scarci-
ty, a fear that the righteous will get less if the wicked are treated better than 
they deserve. To me, this is one of the perils of letting moral performance 
set the parameters for what is at stake between God and us. 
By contrast, Duns Scotus begins with abundance, with the unsurpassable 
and inexhaustible riches of infinite Godhead, with first and last things, with 
the eternal glory of the Blessed Trinity, with their project to widen the circle, 
by bringing many sons and daughters, humans and angels to the glory, to 
face-to-face intimacy and enjoyment of God. For Scotus, election, 
Incarnation, gifts and graces, are means to that end, and come prior in the 
order of explanation to any Divine consideration of the problem of sin. For 
the Subtle Doctor, Adam's fall and its consequences seem to represent minor 
plot complications, easily folded into the God's grand and surprizing plan." 
In her Revelations of Divine Love, Dame Julian of Norwich writes to reas-
sure those who are spiritually serious but now bogged down in sin and its 
ante-mortem consequences. She sets the struggles of "this passing life time" 
in the context of Our Triune Mother Who enfolds and indwells us, of 
Mother Jesus from Whom we are ever being born and never delivered, of 
Christ Our Suitor Who climbs the cross to perform His deed of knightly 
valor, of a future heavenly welcome, of honors to be paid us by the Father, 
of friendly at-homeness with God.26 Again, Bernard of Clairvaux, Teresa of 
Avila, John of the Cross and others experience the soul's union with God 
as with a Love Who surrOlmds and suffuses, penetrates, fills and fulfills.27 
For all of these thinkers, Boundless Love, Eternal Life constitutes the 
environment and sets the agenda. Mother Love takes the initiative with 
carnal knowledge, with psycho-spiritual intimacy, with real presence. It 
begins with joy and wonder, with the desire to nurture, to help the other 
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grow up to full stature, over and over again to renegotiate relationships, to 
find ways to become and remain life-long friends. Lovers want to get 
inside each other, as much as possible to experience what it is like to be the 
other, to see and value the world from the other's point of view, from time 
to time to lose themselves in ecstactic union. Neither way is moral perfor-
mance the be-all-and-end-all. Discipline, education, the habits they culti-
vate are needed to transform infants into friends and lovers. Ante-mortem 
we never get beyond the need of it, any more than we will permanently 
graduate from the purgative to the illuminative way. Yet, its purpose is 
not to enable us to follow the rules, perform our obligations, promote 
human welfare, or even to become fine specimens of human being. The 
Conferences of Cassian on the monastic life make it clear that virtue, even 
purity of heart, are only skillful means to the end of wholesome relation-
ship, beatific intimacy, and life together.28 If the words of the liturgy are to 
be believed, God didn't make us for the purpose of compiling virtuoso 
moral records; rather God created all things to fill them with Divine 
Blessing and to rejoice in God's radiant splendor.29 
What I had to say in my book attempted to reflect these latter perspec-
tives. If Divinity is Boundless Love and Eternal Life, generosity sets the tone, 
and liberality is the order of the day. "There's a wideness in God's mercy." 
If the relatively righteous and the horror victims are getting infinitely more 
than they can ask or imagine, why should they-much less God-want hor-
ror perpetrators to receive any less? When the relatively righteous experi-
ence the metaphysical size-gap between them and God, they will be amazed 
and amused that God takes any notice of their moral performance, either of 
their successes or of their failures (d. Psalm 8 and the soteriological calcula-
tions of Scotus and Ockham). Horror participants will be dumbfounded at 
the cancelling disproportions: as the power of horrors prima facie to destroy 
positive meaning is disproportionate to the length of the segments their 
occurrence occupies in the space-time worm of the participant's life; so 
Divine Goodness outclasses horrendous evils, not only devours them but 
makes good on them by infusing them with positive meaning. Horror per-
petrators will be awed, eventually weep with relief that there is surplus 
Goodness to compensate their victims and reverse their harms. 
Rogers is right: repentance is central to New Testament Kingdom-
proclamation. But Rogers is wrong to insist that repentance is only for sin-
ners.3D Literally, 'metanoia' means turning again. The invitation is to leave 
behind one's own, flat world-view, to inhabit a cosmos defined and orga-
nized by God, and to live into the meanings that evermore conscious and 
intentional collaboration with God makes. The Gospels tell us this metanoia 
was even more of a challenge for the relatively righteous (for chosen as 
well as would-be volunteer disciples) than it was for tax collectors and sin-
ners. Horror-participation shatters our horizontal worlds, and makes the 
moral and immoral alike desperate for the Inner Teacher we always need. 
VI. Modem Manichaeism? 
In the Confessions, Book VII, Augustine tells us that one reason for his 
youthful attraction to Manicheanism was its promise of an easy solution to 
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the problem of evil. According to him, Manicheanism was metaphysically 
dualistic, positing an essentially good substance--spirit-and an essentially 
evil substance--matter-and treating them as alike necessarily extant fea-
tures of the universe. Because the existence of matter was supposed to be 
necessary and coeval with God, God cannot be responsible for either per-
mitting or causing its existence in the first place, or for eliminating it in the 
end. After reading Platonist books and listening to Ambrose, Augustine 
rejected Manicheanism, and tried to manage the problem of evil by appeals 
to the Platonic doctrine of evil as a privation and to a free will defense. 
According to Rogers, it seemed prima facie to her that my picture of 
human being as a hybrid of matter and spirit, by itself dysfunctional and 
so unclean as a result of what it is, skated too close to the edge of that 
"Platonism and Manicheanism that Augustine defeated a millennium and 
a half ago." For it looked to her as if [i] I were associating matter with evil. 
My quote from Douglas that dirt is powerful and dangerous, appeared [ii] 
to assign evil positive power over and against God. My contention that the 
defilement of human nature is metaphysically necessary, made it look as if 
I were [iii] granting evil a positive power over and against God so great as 
to be outside Divine controP She also complains that [iv] my dim view of 
human being runs contrary to affirmations both by Genesis 1 and the 
Augustinian tradition that human nature is in itself good.32 
Her worries give me the opportunity to recall how Julian of Norwich 
analyzes human being into a higher (intellectual) nature and a lower (sen-
sory, bodily) nature. She insists that each part is good-after all, both are 
and will forever remained joined to God, the higher at creation and the 
lower in the Incarnation. Sin is "nothing" but the privation of appropriate 
coordination resulting from the incompetence of our immaturity. In effect, 
she sees the goodness of the whole eschatologically in their future coordi-
nation, and omnitemporally in the love of God that freely counts us as 
delightful children. 
Likewise, in my book, I have not said, nor do I believe that matter, 
body, or animality is bad or evil. Nor have I endorsed any soteriological 
plot that involves a Manichean escape of spirit from the imprisonment in 
matter. On the purity and defilement calculus, dirt is stuff out of order, 
dysfunctional heterogeneity. The defilement of personal animality in 
itself does not arise from body or animality alone or from spirit or per-
sonality alone, but from the lack of functional coordination between 
them. The biblical Holiness Code makes "dirty is catching" axiomatic, 
not because dirt has positive power, but because human beings have lim-
ited power and ingenuity to organize heterogeneity into functional har-
mony. Although I agree with tradition that God cannot do the meta-
physically impossible, and so cannot make it the case that human spirit 
has sufficient power in itself organize human being into a functional 
unity; this does not mean that God cannot triangulate Divine power into 
the equation to become a functional partner in effecting such integration. 
My soteriological plot line remains incarnational, but it is one that gives 
us new functional identities in the Pauline manner: "I-not-I-but-Christ" 
(Galatians 2:19-20)! 
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VII. Voices of Authority: 
Most Christian philosophers and theologians see themselves as standing 
within a tradition, and hold themselves responsible to certain authorities 
which they regard as somehow regulative of what can count as a Christian 
point of view. Thus, in debates about philosophical theology, appeals to 
authority are not merely rhetorical or dialectical manuveurs, but can func-
tion to preserve Christian ideological identity. Nor is the idea that some 
select group of texts and authors define a field, peculiar to Christian philos-
ophy or theology. Most university disciplines in the humanities and social 
sciences have their "canon" which undergraduate majors are required to 
read and graduate students to steep themselves in if they are to be certified 
as legitimate members of their professional guilds. 
Rogers tells us that her" own method in philosophizing about religion is 
to weight the tradition of the Church very heavily" including the way "the 
tradition has clearly taken Scripture."33 For Rogers, a wide range of author-
ities-Augustine, Anselm of Canterbury, "the vast majority of the major 
Christian thinkers in the Latin west from the time of Augustine at least 
through Aquinas in the mid-thirteenth century," the Roman Catholic 
Church, and many contemporary philosophers of religion-establish an 
almost unbudgeable presumption in favor of "free fall theodicy."34 
Likewise, "Augustine and every orthodox thinker at least up through the 
Renaissance" weigh in favor of the claim that God makes human beings 
good.35 Traditional readings of Scripture tell against universalism.36 The 
endorsement of "most contemporary philosophers of religion" imposes a 
burden of proof in favor of moral realism/7 while putative consequences 
that "most standard brand Christians should find insupportable"38 clinch 
her case against "rejecting the tradition in favor of Adams's altemative."39 
Medieval latin philosophical theologians also appealed to a variety of 
authorities, and assigned them a range of weights. Pre-eminent were the 
infallible authorities of Scripture, the Creeds, and the pronouncements of 
the ecumenical councils. Other ecclesiastical declarations were held to be 
fallible but-at least locally and temporarily-binding, if not on what 
experts can think, at least on what they may publically say (d. Wodeham 
on Kilwardby's condemnation of the unity of substantial forms). Anselm 
concedes to the Church fathers a defeasible presumption, not only of truth 
but also of completeness of doctrinal coverage. Later on, the burden of 
proof seems more easily rebuttable, but-depending on the topic-their 
texts and views must be seriously engaged or at least explained away. For 
philosophical points-e.g., in logic, epistemology, physics, and meta-
physics-Aristotle, Boethius, Avicenna, and Averroes enjoyed a compara-
ble presumption. Even in the fourteenth century, lesser but non-negligible 
weight was granted to theological consensus and the philosophical or 
interpretive mind of "the common school." 
Nevertheless, during the middle ages, even infallible authorities were 
not merely memorized, quoted, or commented upon, but set up against 
one another in apparent contradiction thereby to problematize doctrinal 
claims, then questioned and disputed to win a deeper understanding. 
They were also opposed by bringing pro or contra arguments from other 
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fields (such as physics or philosophy) the better to integrate theological 
claims with the rest of human knowledge. Wide-ranging disagreements 
were not only tolerated but promoted in the schools, because medieval 
philosophical theologians were accustomed to distinguish between 
dogma-which ecclesiastical bodies require all the faithful to believe-and 
theological explanation-which shoulders the burden of providing precise 
formulations of what "the articles of faith" mean, of answering detailed 
questions about them, and fine-grained accounts of how they could be 
true. During the middle ages, there were as many rigorously worked out 
understandings of the questions on Lombard's theology syllabus as there 
were contrasting philosophical positions. In this process, past minority 
reports could be particularly useful, precisely because of their "left-field" 
quality could be skillfully deployed to expose weaknesses, to force clarifi-
cation, and to provoke more nuanced articulations of main-line positions."') 
The last hundred twenty-five years of biblical scholarship has exerted 
considerable pressure on Christian thinkers to abandon harmonizing 
hermeneutics and to take seriously the notion that Holy Scriptures them-
selves preserve a wide variety of sometimes conflicting theological perspec-
tives. Within the Wisdom literature, Proverbs and some psalms express 
confidence that the world naturally runs and/or is governed by the Act-
Consequence Principle ("good for good; evil for evil"), while Job and 
Ecclesiastes mount sharp but contrasting critiques of this idea. Ezra and 
Nehemiah press a "separatist" policy to maintain ethnic purity, while Ruth 
and Jonah insist upon the godliness of foreigners. Genesis sets the numi-
nous stories of Abram's flaming-tire-pot covenant (Genesis 15) and Jacob 
wrestling by the river (Genesis 32:24-32), alongside a wisdom-style portrait 
of Joseph as a paradigm of prudent rule. Despite centuries of explaining 
evidence away, the Bible can still be heard to equivocate on the issue of 
child sacrifice,'! not to mention genocide. Biblical scholars invite us to see 
how-with the patriarchal period reaching back to circa 1700 BCE-our 
texts still bear the stamp of the widely varying cultural frameworks of the 
human authors in many times and places. Scholars speculate that ancient 
editors did not simply "white out" such discomfiting discontinuities lest we 
lose information about God and the people of God by being denied the 
opportunity to enter into and wrestle with alternative points of view. 
As a Christian philosopher and theologian, I treat the Bible, the 
Apostles' and Nicene creeds, and the declarations of the ecumenical coun-
cils as primary authorities. In particular, I take the creeds as lenses through 
which to focus the many witnesses of Scripture, which I take to be the pri-
mary tool of spiritual formation for Christians and for Christians the pri-
mary source of divine disclosure and revelation. Reacting to such develop-
ments at the turn of the last century, Bishop Charles Gore urged Christian 
thinkers to respect the authority of Scripture, not by endorsing the infalli-
bility of some harmonized interpretation, but by "putting oneself to school 
to it," especially to those parts that one finds least congenial, to allow one-
self to be turned upside down and backwards to get inside its perspective, 
the better to squeeze out insights about the nature and character of God:" 
As a Christian philosopher and theologian, I regard God as the only 
infallible authority. Among texts, I COWlt Scriptures as the primary tool of 
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spiritual formation and principal locus of Divine disclosure and revelation 
for Christians. I take the Apostles' and Nicene creeds and the declarations 
of the ecumenical councils as lenses that rightly focus how-for the pur-
poses of Christian devotion and theology-the Bible is to be read. So far as 
past theologians are concerned, I take very seriously the Church Fathers as 
well as the philosophical theologians and spiritual writers of the medieval 
latin West. Certainly, I have paid Anselm and medieval Franciscans the 
dubious honor of persistent professional engagement throughout my adult 
life. As an Episcopal priest, I add to these representatives of the Anglican 
tradition, particularly in the period from Gore to Temple. Although I do 
hold the creeds to be non-negotiable boundaries, and Holy Scriptures as 
daily bread, for me to take the others as authorities is not a matter of agree-
ing with everything they sayar of letting their majority rule, but of a com-
mitment to put myself to school to them, to question and dispute them, to 
learn all I can, to be formed and informed by them, even if in the end I beg 
to differ in greater or lesser degree. 
If my book is often "in" the reader's "face" with neglected values and 
angles, most of them have a traditional pedigree. Rogers challenges my 
definition of horrors on the ground that it would be immoral (Augustine 
implies, impious because insulting to God) ever to doubt whether one's life 
could be a great good to one on the wholeY But, unsurprizingly, I have 
begun philosophizing with the book of Job, which features the ruinous 
power of human suffering and the metaphysical size-gap between us and 
God. Job does count his sufferings as reason to wish he had been born 
dead, lodges responsibility for them with God, accuses God of being more 
of a chaos-monster than a creator, charges God with slaying the innocent 
with the guilty, and demands a day in court. Job's blasphemous tirade is 
rewarded with what few hebrew bible characters get: a face-to-face vision 
of the bigness and the goodness of God! True, Job is given to see and to 
hear how the size-gap disqualifies him as an expert on God's cosmic com-
petence. But God certifies Job's expertise on the seemingly ruinious power 
of suffering on human life. Thus, God praises Job for telling the truth 
when his friends lied (Job 42:7). 
What drove me to take the purity and defilement calculus and the honor 
code so seriously, was not a pre-established fascination with anthropology 
but their very entrenchment in the Bible's own formulations of what is 
soteriologically at stake. God as Mother is not only gets biblical mentions, 
but also is featured by Anselm (in his prayer to St. Paul) and the later 
medieval monastic and mystical traditions.44 God as Lover a la the allego-
rized Song of Songs is steady theme from Origen to Bernard of Clairvaux 
to St. Teresa of Avila (a Doctor of the Church).4' Origen and Gregory of 
Nyssa in the East, Julian of Norwich (commemorated by the Book of 
Common Prayer calendar) and other medieval women mystics, at least flirt 
with universalism. Ireneaus and Julian see our ante-mortem human journey 
as beginning with the incompetence of immaturity. Unsurprizingly, I note 
with interest that "free fall" gets short shrift in the canonical Scriptures 
(only in Genesis 2-3 and Romans 5), while other hypotheses about the 
source of evil also get mentions (e.g., the nephilim of Genesis 6 and 
Leviathan or Rahab of the deep). Nor is free-fall enshrined in ancient 
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creeds or ecumenical pronouncements. It is the Reformed catechisms-
e.g., the Belgic Confession (1561), the Heidelberg Catechism (1563), the 
Second Helvetic Confession (1566), the Canons of Dort (1618-1619), and the 
Westminster Confession of Faith (1646)-(curiously not mentioned by 
Rogers) that explicitly prescribe it. But in this age of ecumenism most 
would agree that not all Christians are Reformed-which brings me to my 
final point. 
Throughout her paper, Rogers is vigorous in warning my readers and 
me that my views on suffering and salvation constitute a decidedly minori-
ty report. I do not deny it. I do, however, wish to lodge a counter-warn-
ing. The Christian tradition is a wide and mighty river, charging energeti-
cally over rapids, full of under-, cross- and counter-currents. We show its 
vitality by our vigorous disagreement. But we will all be losers, even 
betray what we mean to serve, if we go beyond this to narrow the stream 
by counting each other out! 
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